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IN TI IE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v 
LEROY RAYMOND JACKSON, 
Appellant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 890546-CA 
Priority No 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant J' (^  • J . t- • ' t h ^  T T4~ =•. I A |: > i •»: • 1 l a t e 
Procedure, Peti - Jackson files this petition 
rehearing. In Cumminas v. Nielson, • > ' '>• * •« Il•"«' . I 29 I1 (1912), 
Supreme Court noted the appropriate st^ndar^ iv.r filing a 
petition: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of 
right, and we have no desire to discourage the 
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in proper 
cases. When this court, however, has considered and 
decided all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, unless we 
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or 
decision which may affect the result, or that we have 
based the decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result . . . If there are some 
reasons, however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a petition for a rehearing should 
be promptly filed and, if it is meritorious, its form 
will in no case be scrutinized by this court. 
129 P, it I ' l l !J ( u„ I ,« I, I I or rehearing meets the preceding 
standards and should be granted for n Lparens discussed below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 11, 1990, this Court affirmed the trial court's 
conviction of Defendant/Appellant/Petitioner LeRoy R. Jackson for 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), -8(2)(b)(ii) (Supp. 
1989) (effective until July 1, 1990), and Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), -8(2)(e) (Supp. 1989) (effective until July 1, 
1990). The Court of Appeals decision is attached as Addendum A. 
Mr. Jackson has received one 14 day extension for filing this 
Petition for Rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this petition, the pertinent facts are set 
forth and incorporated within the argument section below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court found, and the officer admitted that his car was 
moving when he was approached by the defendant. Because the 
defendant parked his car first and could observe the officer move 
towards him, the defendant acted in response to the officer's show 
of authority. The encounter may have been voluntary had the 
defendant walked for a distance before meeting the officer, but the 
officer moved in so close to the defendant that a blocking had 
occurred. This Court's opinion did not address how the officer 
moved into and blocked the defendant's access out of the parking 
lot. 
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Alternatively, this Court's opinion overlooked the fact 
that the officer had no reason to question the defendant's checkmart 
identification card. The officer admitted that the checkmart card 
confirmed the defendant's identity and also acknowledged that he had 
already recognized the defendant by name on sight. Regardless of 
the officer's past problems with checkmart identification cards, no 
such concern arose in the case at bar. The encounter cannot be 
deemed voluntary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MOVEMENTS OF THE OFFICER EVIDENCED THE NONCONSENSUAL 
NATURE OF THE ENCOUNTER 
In its decision, this Court noted: "A fourth amendment 
analysis of police conduct is fact sensitive; thus, we review the 
facts in detail." State v. Jackson, No. 890546-CA (December 11, 
1990) (hereinafter referred to as Slip. Op.) at 2. Overlooked by 
the opinion, however, were the following undisputed facts. 
As explained by this Court, "[Officer] Hurst followed 
defendant's vehicle into the parking lot. After parking his 
vehicle, defendant exited and approached Hurst's vehicle while it 
was still moving." Slip. op. at 2. "[A]lthough the trial court 
found that [Officer] Hurst had ultimately blocked defendant's car, 
the blocking did not occur until after defendant had exited his car 
of his own volition." Slip. op. at 4. The opinion also noted, 
"Defendant was free to walk to the bar or wherever he chose; he 
voluntarily chose to confront Hurst." Slip. op. at 5. 
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The opinion would have been entirely proper if the 
defendant had driven straight into a parking stall, exited his car, 
and then approached the officer's car which happened to be still 
moving. But Officer Hurst's very own testimony indicated a 
different scenerio. "[Hurst] stayed up by the driveway into the 
parking lot because as soon as [the defendant's car pulled to the 
east end of the parking lot and] stopped, it went into reverse, came 
back out, did sort of a half circle turn, and pulled straight back 
into another parking stall on the north side of the parking lot." 
(MS 17, 23); (T 7-8). Hurst "didn't know whether [the defendant's 
car] was going to leave the parking lot or what it was going to 
do." (MS 17-18). Hurst waited in the driveway "until [the 
defendant] maneuvered into a different parking stall than he had 
initially pulled into." (MS 23); see Appellant's opening brief 
at 4. Initially stationary. Officer Hurst's car was moving only 
because he had accelerated his car towards the defendant. The 
officer's car was not simply moving near the driveway at the bottom 
of the parking lot when the defendant approached Hurst, Hurst's car 
was directly upon the defendant at the time of the encounter. 
Hurst had just watched the defendant park his car. If 
Hurst watched the defendant from a distance, Hurst would have had to 
accelerate quickly from his parked position to the stall where the 
defendant had just parked in order to be still "moving" when the 
defendant approached him. If Hurst watched closeby, he would have 
had to be on the defendant's "footsteps" in order to be still 
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"moving" at the time of the encounter. In either situation, the 
defendant faced forward and would have seen the officer moving his 
car into position. The officer did not just happen to be moving; he 
showed his authority by coming upon the defendant quickly—evidenced 
by the fact that he was still moving—and making sure that the 
defendant would respond by blocking his car. The encounter cannot 
be considered voluntary. Lending additional support for these 
circumstances is a recent United States Supreme Court decision which 
was relied on during oral argument but not briefed by either party. 
See Brower v. County of Invo, 489 U.S. , 103 L.Ed.2d 628, 635, 
109 S.Ct. 1378 (1989) ("A seizure occurs even when an unintended 
person or thing is the object of the detention or taking . . . when 
there is a governmental termination of freeedom of movement through 
means intentionally applied.") 
POINT II 
THE OFFICERS UNNECESSARY REQUESTS FOR IDENTIFICATION 
MADE THE ENCOUNTER INVOLUNTARY 
This Court also explained that the officer's request for 
identification from the defendant was not unreasonable: 
Hurst's request for identification did not constitute 
a seizure because defendant voluntarily initiated the 
contact and was free to go at any time and not answer 
Hurst's questions. When defendant produced a 
Checkmart identification card, it was reasonable for 
Hurst to ask for his driver's license because his past 
experience with Checkmart identification cards was 
unsatisfactory, and because defendant had just driven 
a vehicle. Defendant voluntarily provided the 
information that his license had been taken. At that 
point, Hurst had an articulable suspicion that a crime 
had been committed; that is Hurst had seen defendant 
driving a vehicle without a license. Thus, a lawful 
seizure occurred at this time. 
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Slip. op. at 6-7. 
Omitted by the opinion, however, was the officer's 
admission that he had no reason "to believe that Jackson's Checkmart 
I.D. was false." (MS 25). Even if Hurst had experienced problems 
with Checkmart identification cards, that fact would have no bearing 
here because Hurst recognized the defendant on sight and believed 
that the Checkmart identification card corroborated his identity. 
(MS 24); (T 17-19); see Appellant's opening brief at 25-26. 
Producing his checkmart identification card pursuant to the 
officer's request may have been arguably proper, but for the officer 
to request further identification when he knew there was nothing 
wrong with the checkmart card was improper. 
The officer could not justify his inquiry because the 
defendant had been driving a car. Officer Hurst's "reasonable 
suspicion" arose only in hindsight and not when the defendant was 
admittedly driving in a "normal" and appropriate manner down the 
street. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). Hurst 
did not see the defendant drive a vehicle without a license. 
Rather, he only saw the defendant driving his car. Hurst had no 
reason to believe that the defendant was driving without a license. 
The officer's conduct cannot be justified by the fruits of the 
encounter when the extended inquiry should have never occurred in 
the first place. See Appellant's reply brief at 9. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner Jackson respectfully requests a rehearing by 
this Court on the matters overlooked by its opinion. 
SUBMITTED this T) day of January, 1991. 
RONALD SAFUJINO 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
CERTIFICATION 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for Appellant/Petitioner in this case; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to unnecessarily delay disposition of this 
matter.
 / 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ day of January, 1991. 
tONALD S. FUETINI RONA TINO 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
- 7 -
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of January, 1991. 
Ronald sV Ftij ino 
DELIVERED by t h i s day 
o f December, 1990 . 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DEC 111990 
ooooo— ^ W ) ^ ^ * ^ 
^ c Wary T. Noonan 
S t a t e of Utah, ) OPINION Yierk of the Court ) (For Publication
 Court of Appea l s 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ) 
- .) ' Case No 890546-CA 
V. ) 
F I L E D 
LeRoy Raymond Jackson, (December 11, 1990) 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
Attorneys: Karen Stam and Ronald iur 
Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R Larsen, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Gar <ckson. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Leroy Jackson appeals his conviction of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1990), 
and possession of a controlled substance, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)
 Ka \ 
(Supp. 1990). Defendant contends that, when the officer 
stopped his patrol car in front of defendant's parked vehicle, 
thus blocking it, his fourth amendment right to protection 
against unreasonable search and seizure was violated. 
Alternatively, defendant argues that, when the officer asked 
for his identification and driver's license, he was unlawfully 
seized. Defendant seeks reversal of the trial court's refusal 
to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the stop 
affirm. 
We will not disturb the trial court's factual 
determinations underlying its decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress unless they are clearly erroneous. State v 
Smith. 781 P.2d 879f 881 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). A finding is clearly 
erroneous if it is without adequate evidentiary support or is 
induced by an erroneous view of the law. Hoth v. White, 142 
Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 55 (Ct. App. 1990). We give due regard to 
the trial court's ability to observe the demeanor and judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. Xd; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
A fourth amendment analysis of police conduct is fact 
sensitive; thus, we review the facts in detail. Smith, 781 
P.2d at 880. On May 24, 1989, Officer Hurst of the Salt Lake. 
City Police Department observed defendant's vehicle traveling 
westbound on 1700 South in Salt Lake City. Suspecting that 
defendant's vehicle matched the description of a vehicle 
involved in a robbery, Hurst made a U-turn and followed 
defendant's vehicle for the purpose of running a license plate 
check. Hurst made no attempt to stop defendant's vehicle. 
Before a license plate check could be performed, defendant 
pulled into a parking lot adjacent to the Foxy Lady Bar. Hurst 
followed defendant's vehicle into the parking lot. After 
parking his vehicle, defendant exited and approached Hurst's 
vehicle while it was still moving. Hurst then stopped his 
vehicle behind defendant's car, exited, and walked toward 
defendant. Hurst recognized defendant from a previous 
encounter and called defendant by his last name, but could not 
remember his first name. Upon Hurst's request for 
identification, defendant produced a Checkmart identification 
card with his name and picture on it. Because Hurst had often 
found Checkmart identification cards to be false, and because 
defendant had just been driving a vehicle, he asked defendant 
for his driver's license. Defendant responded that it had been 
taken. Hurst then asked for a vehicle registration. Defendant 
stated that he did not have it because he had only recently 
purchased the vehicle. After running a license plate and 
driver's license check, Hurst discovered that the license plate 
on defendant's vehicle was stolen and his driver's license had 
been suspended. Hurst placed defendant under arrest for 
possession of stolen property and driving on a suspended 
license. A subsequent search of defendant's person revealed 
two small tin foil bindles of cocaine and a marijuana cigarette. 
SEIZURE 
The c e n t r a l inquiry of t h i s c a s e i s whether defendant was 
s e i z e d be fore an a r t i c u l a b l e s u s p i c i o n n'r cr iminal a c t i v i t y 
e x i s t e d . 
In S t a t e v . Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per 
c u r i a m ) , the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged three l e v e l s of 
police encounters with the public that 
permissible: 
officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against 
his will; (2) an officer may seize a 
person if the officer has an -articulable 
suspicion- that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; however, 
the -detention must be temporary and last 
no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or i s being committed. 
Id. at bl/-l8 i quoting United States v. Merritt 7 In ••-..-? , •, 
230 (5th Cir, 1984)) 
A ££rst | e v e| stop, as described in Dietitian, is a 
voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an officer's 
inquiries but is free to leave at any time. However, a seizure 
under the fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable person, in 
view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not 
free to leave. United States v, Mendenhall/ 446 U.S. 544, bb4 
(1980). In Mendenhall, the Supreme Court cited circumstances 
that could indicate a seizure: (1) the threatening presence of 
several officers; (2) the display of a weapon by an officer; 
(3) some physical touching of the person of the citizen; or (4) 
the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance 
with the officer's request might be compelled. X&. at 554. 
The Court acknowledged that the constitution does not prevent a 
police officer from addressing questions to anyone on the 
street. Id* at 553. As long as the person "remains free to 
disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no 
intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under 
the Constitution require some particularized and objective 
justification.- Ifi at 554.x 
In Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554, the defendant was approached 
Dy two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency in an airport 
terminal. The agents identified themselves ?nd asked to see 
her-identification and airline ticket. She gave them her 
driver's license and airline ticket and answered several brief 
questions. When asked, she agreed to accompany the agents to 
an airport office where a body search was conducted which 
revealed contraband. In reviewing the circumstances of the 
A. Blocked Vehicle 
Defendant claims that, when Hurst parked directly behind 
his car, a seizure occurred because defendant believed he was 
not free to leave- Defendant cites State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 
879 (Utah Ct, App. 1989), where this court found that a seizure 
occurred when an officer followed Smith into a motel parking 
lot after Smith made a turn without signaling. The officer 
••blocked the defendant's car, got out of his marked police car 
to talk to defendant late at night, asked for defendant's 
license and registration, issued defendant a traffic citation 
and required defendant to remain while he did a warrants check 
and called a backup officer." !£. at 882. In Smith, this 
court noted that other jurisdictions have held that Hwhen an 
officer blocks a defendant's vehicle, a seizure within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment has occurred even though the 
original stop was not initiated by the officer." lfi. at 882 
n.3. &££ People v. Guv. 329 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1982) (although the initial stop of defendant's vehicle in a 
driveway was not the result of the officer's actions, his 
partial blockage of the driveway and subsequent visit to 
defendant's car clearly constituted a detention of the 
automobile and would be the equivalent of a police-initiated 
-stop"); United States v. Kerr. 817 F.2d 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 
1987) (seizure occurred because it was not possible for 
defendant to drive around the officer's car and defendant 
stopped and exited his car primarily in response to the police 
officer's official appearance and conduct rather than of his 
own volition). 
The above cases, holding that a police officer's blocking 
of another's vehicle constituted a seizure, are distinguishable 
from the case at hand. In the instant case, although the trial 
court found that Hurst had ultimately blocked defendant's car, 
the blocking did not occur until after defendant had exited his 
car of his own volition. Moreover, it was defendant's 
voluntary act that initiated the contact with Hurst, rather 
than Hurst's conduct. Defendant arrived at the parking lot to 
the Foxy Lady Bar not because Hurst was following him, but 
rather because he freely chose to go there. 
(Footnote 1 continued) 
arrest, the Court noted that: (1) the »ii©nf-s wore no uniforms, 
(2) the agents displayed no weapons, (M M»e agents did not 
summon the defendant to their presence, and (4) the agents 
requested, but did not demand, the defendant's identification 
and ticket. JsL. at 555. Consequently, the Court held that the 
defendant did not have any objective reason to believe that she 
was not free to end the conversation and proceed on her way. 
Defendant exited his vehicle and approached Hurst's vehicle 
while it was still moving. Defendant was free to walk to I he 
bar or wherever he chose; he voluntarily chose to confront 
Hurst. This factual situation is similar to that in Layton 
Citv v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), where 
a police officer followed defendant as he parked his truck at a 
construction site. Defendant exited his truck without any 
request by the officer, walked over to the police car as the 
officer was getting out, and freely initiated a conversation. 
We held it was a consensual, voluntary discussion and thus not. 
a seizure subject to fourth amendment protection. Here, wc 
also draw the same conclusion. 
Defendant argues that it was Hursct jqressive manner and 
show of authority that caused him to stop Nothing in the 
record substantiates this argument. Hurst had not actuated his 
light bars, used his siren, nor had he driven in such a manner 
that would cause defendant to think he was required ~^ -•••>* 
over. 
We agree with the t: i: i.al court that, under' the 
circumstances revealed in the record, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he or she was free to leave, notwithstanO.ing 
the fact that his or her vehicle was blocked. Thus, we finr1 no 
clear error in the trial court's finding that defendant's 
liberty was not .restrained and that a seizure did not occui ..;. 
this time. 
° Reques** * . - n 
Defendant argues in i Lternative that, if a seizui 
not occur when Officer Hurst's vehicle stopped behind his 
vehicle, a seizure did occur when Hurst asked for 
identification. The issue is whether, by posing this question, 
Hurst was detaining defendant against his will. We think not. 
m United States v, Castellsnos, 731 F.2d 979, 982-83 (D.c, 
Cir. 1984), the court stated that "[i]t is also well-settleO 
that the fourth amendment is not implicated by every encounter 
between police officers and citizens." The Castellanos court 
held that Has a matter of law, a request for identification 
cannot constitute a show of authority sufficient to convert an 
innocent encounter into a seizure. Only when police have 
some way restrained the liberty of an individual, either by 
force or a show of authority, is there * 'seizure' within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment." !£. »! ?B3. See also Gomez 
v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Terrv v. Ohio. 392 
U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); United States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 
544 (1980). 
In Castellanos, the police responded to a call that a man 
was locked in his car, was unconscious and appeared to be ill 
or suffering from a drug overdose. Subsequent to defendant's 
car door being opened, a policeman asked defendant if he was 
all right- After defendant indicated he was all right, the 
police officer asked him for his driver's license and vehicle 
registration. Considering all the circumstances of the case, 
the court concluded that the presence of a police officer, 
together with a request for identification, would not have led 
a reasonable person to conclude that he or she was being 
compelled to respond and would not be free to leave. Id. at 
983-84. The court further noted that the police officer's 
failure to inform the defendant that he need not respond to any 
questions did not convert what was a nonintrusive encounter at 
that point into a seizure. XcL at 984. 
Similarly, in the instant case, absent a showing of force 
or coercion, Hurst's request for identification did not 
constitute a seizure. The trial court properly concluded that, 
in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person in 
defendant's position would have believed he or she was free to 
leave because nothing in the record indicated that Hurst acted 
in a way that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he 
or she was compelled to produce identification, or that he or 
she could not freely walk away. 
Defendant argues that Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), 
stands for the proposition that the mere request for 
identification constitutes a seizure. We do not agree. Brown 
involved a Texas statute that makes it a criminal act to refuse 
to give one's name and address to an officer who has lawfully 
stopped a person and requested the information. Brown was 
stopped and then detained for refusing to identify himself. 
The Court held that a seizure occurred because defendant was 
detained for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, 
not merely because he was asked for identification. X&. at 
50. Obviously, Brown was compelled to identify himself and was 
not free to leave. 
Applying the Deitman standard to the facts of this case, 
Hurst's request for identification did not constitute a seizure 
because defendant voluntarily initiated the contact and was 
free to go at any time and not answer Hurst's questions. When 
defendant produced a Checkmart identi£i';»»-!on card, it was 
reasonable for Hurst to ask for his 0iiv«i. \s license because 
his past experience with Checkmart identification cards was 
unsatisfactory, and because defendant had just driven a 
vehicle. Defendant voluntarily provided the information that 
his license had been taken. At that point, Hurst had an 
articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed; that is, 
Hurst had seen defendant driving a vehicle without a license. 
Thus, a lawful seizure occurred at this time. After Hurst 
determined from the dispatcher that defendant's driver's 
license had been suspended and that the license plate was 
stolen, he had probable cause to make the arrest. Therefore, 
the cocaine and marijuana were taken from defendant's person by 
a search incident to a lawful arrest. 
The trial court's findings ot faci nwu against the 
clear weight of the evidence. Nothing the record indicates 
a seizure before an articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
arose. 
The c/nvicti ffirmed, 
Signal W. Garff, Judg 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, x/udge 
